Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Kretzmann/Stump, Parmenides and Wesley Salmon

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


57 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon]
Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon]
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science [Salmon]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]